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Volume XVI JANUARY, 1951 Number 1
THE QUALITIES OF THE REASONABLE MAN
IN NEGLIGENCE CASESt,
FLEMING JAMES, JR.*
Negligence is "conduct which falls below the standard established by
law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.", And
this standard of conduct is ordinarily measured by what the reasonably
prudent man would do under the circumstances. As everyone knows this
reasonable man is a creature of the law's imagination: the present article
will seek to examine the qualities with which the law endows its creature,
under varying circumstances. This of course is in part the old inquiry
whether negligence is subjective or objective.2 But the inquiry has too
often been pursued without paying enough attention to the compensation
of accident victims, which is one of the avowed objectives of tort law even
under the fault principle.3 Moreover the practical effects of letting the jury
apply the standard in most cases have not always had the attention they
deserve.
By and large the law has chosen external, objective standards of con-
duct. The reasonably prudent man is, to be sure, endowed with some of
the qualities of the person whose conduct is being judged, especially where
the latter has greater knowledge, skill, or the like, than people generally.
But many of the actor's shortcomings such as awkwardness, faulty percep-
tThe author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. D. K. Sigerson
(LL.B., Yale, 1950) in the preparation of this article, which will form part of a
forthcoming treatise on Torts by the author and Professor Fowler V. Harper.
Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 282
(1934) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT, TORTS).
2. See Seavey, Negligence--wbjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1927); Terry, Negligece, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 47 et seq. (1915); POLLOCK, TORTS
350 (14th ed. 1939); HOLMES, TEE COMMON LAW 107 et seq. (1881); HARPER,
LAW o TORTS, §§ 70, (1933); PROSSER, TORTS § 36 (1941). Cf. Edgerton, Negli-
gence, Inadvertence and Indifference, 39 HARv. L. REV. 849 (1925).
3. POLLOCK, TORTS 47 (14th ed. 1939) (Excursus A, by Landon); PROSSER,
TORTS §§ 1, 2 (1941); GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 76-77, 141 (1930).
(1)
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tion, or poor judgment, are not taken into account if they fall below the
general level of the community. This means that individuals are often held
guilty of legal fault for failing to live up to a standard which as a matter
of fact they cannot meet. Such a result shocks people who believe in re-
fining the fault principle so as to make legal liability correspond more closely
to personal moral shortcoming.4 There has, therefore, been some pressure
towards-the adoption of a more subjective test. But if the standard of con-
duct is relaxed for defendants who cannot meet a normal standard, then the
burden of accident loss resulting from the extra hazards created by society's
most dangerous groups (e.g. the young, the novice, the accident prone) will
be thrown on the innocent victims of substandard behavior. Such a conclu-
sion shocks people who believe that the compensation of accident victims
is a more important objective of modern tort law than a further refinement
of the tort principle, and that compensation should prevail when the two
objectives conflict. The application of a relaxed subjective standard to the
issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence, however, involves no such con-
flict. On this issue the forces of the two objectives combine to demand a
subjective test: the refinement of the fault principle furthers the compensa-
tion of accident victims by cutting down a defense that would stand in its
way. For this reason the writer has elsewhere developed the thesis that there
should be an explicit double standard of conduct, namely, an external stand-
ard for a defendant's negligence, and a (relaxed) subjective standard for
contributory negligence." Even if this thesis is rejected, the same result
probably prevails anyhow, because the application of the legal standard is
largely left to the jury, and juries, by and large, tend to resolve doubts on
both issues in favor of plaintiffs.
Recent studies into the causes of accident have raised very acutely
the problems mentioned above. These studies show that the accident
proneness of a fairly small group of persons causes most of the accidents,
and that while accident proneness may often be classed as a personality
defect it seldom points to anything like moral fault.6 The present article
does not deal with these studies but rather with the conventional-perhaps
archaic-classifications of human traits and attributes usually made in the
4. See Ames, Law and Moralr, 22 HAtv. L. Rzv. 97, 99 (1908); Bohlen,
Liability on Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MicH. L. REV. 9 (1924); Char-
bonneau v. Mac Rury, 84 N. H. 501, 508, 153 At. 457, 461, 462 (1931).
5. James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HAxtv.
L. REv. 769 (1950).
6. Id., note 5, supra.
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legal literature on the subject. An attempt will be made however to view
these qualities in the light of the modem accident problem and of the various
objectives tort law may serve in solving it.
ATrRIBUTES oF THE REASONABLY PRUDENT PERSON;
GENERAL CONSmERATIONS
The law here impinges on actual cases predominantly through the
language of instructions to the jury, though it may also bear on the ex-
clusion or admission of evidence, and sometimes leads to taking a case away
from the jury. To the extent that it is the former, it may well be more a
matter of finding a form of statement that will be upheld on appeal than
a guide to what factors juries actually consider in determining the negligence
issue.7 However objective the test laid down in the charge, the trial of an
accident case always furnishes a host of indications as to the subjective factors
(as to what kind of people the parties are) and it is hard indeed to believe
that these do not weigh heavily with the jury (and for that matter, with
the court). In actual practice the personal equation will be very much taken
into account.8 Since, however, appellate courts and lawyers, for purposes
of appeal, analyze the language of the charge on the assumptiong that juries
can and do follow it, we shall proceed on the same assumption to examine
the rules which will be given the jury for determining the extent to which
they are to judge a party's conduct in the light of his own qualities on the
one hand, or by applying the community standard on the other. In this
connection one further thing should be noted. Instructions which lay down
the reasonable man 'standard in general terms without specific reference
to the following factors will be upheld in the absence of special features
7. "The difference lies between law in statement and law in operation; be-
tween jural postulates and jury judgments." GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 178 (1930).
8. "Age, sex, color, temperament, indifference, courage, intelligence, power
of observation, judgment, quickness of reaction, self control, imagination, memory,
deliberation, prejudices, experience, health, education, ignorance, attractiveness,
weakness, strength, poverty, and any of the other possible assortments of qualities
and characteristics of the persons involved may each be a factor in the jury's judg-
ment on the negligence issue." GREEN, op. cit. supra., 180.
"The cautionary charges given by courts are in recognition that some of these
factors are considered by juries." GREEN, op. cit. supra, 181, n. 33.
For examples illustrating the effects of the parties' personal characteristics on
jury's verdicts generally, see CORNELIUS, TRIAL TAcTics (1932).
9. It is not implied that the assumption is altogether unwarranted. The
judge himself, and the flavor and general tenor of his charge probably often have a
great deal of influence and many jurors conscientiously try to follow them. But
there are some psychological feats which it is difficult to expect ordinary human
beings to perform. See comments of Frank, J., (diss.) in U. S. v. Farina, 184 F.
2d 18, 22 (C. C. A. 2d 1950).
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in the case and (where local practice requires it) an appropriate request
to charge.10 But if the judge undertakes to deal with any of these factors
specifically, he will be in error if he uses inappropriate language.l1
MoRAL QUALITIES; JUDGMENT
The determination of whether a man's conduct is negligent involves
some moral evaluation. As Seavey points out, under the fault theory of
liability, an actor "is permitted . . . to condemn the interests of others
to his own use to the extent that he is permitted to act without liability
although knowing that his conduct involves a substantial chance of in-
juring persons or property of others."12 In this weighing of the actor's
interests against the perceivable risk to others from attaining them in the
way his conduct entails, the test is purely objective. The community
conscience and community notions of the proper dividing line between al-
truism and self-interest govern not those of the individual, be they higher
or lower. The same thing is true as to other moral qualities like courage,
self-control, and will power.1 s
Clearly the question of the judgment that the actor will be required
to exercise looms very large in any evaluation of his conduct. The word,
as courts use it, is equivocal. It may refer to the balancing of selfish
against altruistic interests referred to in the last paragraph and this is a
matter of moralquality. But it may also refer to the quality of being able
to perceive and appreciate what risks are involved in a certain activity, and
this is more 'a matter of skill, experience and intelligence than of morals.
The ambiguity, however, is not of much consequence as the actor must use
the judgment of the standard man in pretty nearly all the senses in which
that word is used.1 ' This does not mean that errors of judgment will always
10. Agranowitz v. Levine, 298 Mich. 18, 298 N.W. 388 (1941) (not error. to
omit consideration of plaintiff's advanced age in instruction on contributory
negligence in absence of specific request).
11. Hurzon v. Schmitz, 262 Ill. App. 337 (1932) (omission of reference to child
plaintiff's experience); Clary Maytag Co. v. Rhyne, 41 Ga. App. 72, 151 S.E. 686
(1930) (omission of reference to child plaintiff's capacities); cf. Sheffield v. Yager,
256 App. Div. 748, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 673 (1st Dep't 1939) (instruction that child
plaintiff "not held to such degree of care as an adult or a person of mature years"
inadequate; plaintiff requested further instructions).
12. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HAv. L. Rv, 1, 8, n. 7
(1927).
13. Seavey, op. cit., supra., n. 12, pp. 10, 11. "Excessive altruism is as much
a departure from the standard morality as excessive selfishness.. ." Id., p. 11.
14. "Instead . . . of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-
extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the
length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which
[Vol. 16
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be negligence.' 5 As we have noted, the standard man is not infallible and
conduct is to be judged as of the time it is engaged in, not with the benefit
of hindsight.16 Mistakes in judgment which the standard man might have
made in the light of these limitations will not amount to negligence.' 7
KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE, PERCEPTION OF THE RIsK
Knowledge is fundamental to liability for negligence.'s The very
concept of negligence presupposes that the actor either does foresee an un-
reasonable risk of injury, or could foresee it if he conducted himself as a
reasonably prudent man. Foreseeability of harm, in turn, unless it is to
depend on supernatural revelation, must depend on knowledge.19 Knowl-
edge has been defined as the consciousness of the existence of a fact,20 and
fact includes not only objects apparent to the senses but the characteristics
and traits of people and animals and the properties and propensities of
things-the laws of nature, human and otherwise.21
It has often been pointed out that conduct is to be judged as of the
time it is engaged in,22 and it is the knowledge which the actor had or
requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would
observe." per Tindal, C. J. in Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N. C. 468, 475 (1837).
See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Aitken (The Germanic), 196 U. S. 598, 49
L. Ed. 610, 25 Sup. Ct. 317 (1905).
15. "Even a standard man, being human and therefore fallible may err."
Terry, Negligenzce, 29 HARv. L. REv. 40, 48 (191$).
16. Rzeszewski v. Barth, 324 Ill. App. 345, 58 N.E. 2d 269 (1945) (defendant
not negligent in striking plaintiff's car while veering back onto roadway from nar-
row shoulder on which he had been forced by oncoming car); Noll v. Marion, 347
Pa. 213, 32 A. 2d 18 (1943) (defendant's bank clerk not negligent in ducking instead
obeying hold up man's order to remain still); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Aitken (The Germanic), supra., p. 595.
17. Peck v. United States, 172 F. 2d 331 (C. C. A. 10th 1949) (plaintiff
held -not to have acted as prudent man when he made sharp turn to right on being
overtaken by army ambulance); V. T. C. Lines v. Murray, 309 Ky. 643, 218 S.W.
2d 675 (1949) (error not to give instruction on emergency doctrine where bus driver
suddenly confronted by boy on bicycle); Gamalia v. Badillo, 53 Cal. App. 2d 375,
128 P. 2d 184 (1942) (defendant not negligent in applying brakes when back
wheel broke off).
18. "The foundation of liability for negligence is knowledge-or what is
deemed in law to be the same thing, 'opportunity, by the exercise of reasonable
diligence to acquire knowledge-'" See Green v. Atlantic Charlotte Air Line Ry.,
131 S. C. 124, 133, 126 S.E. 441, 444, 48 A. L. R. 1448 (1925). See also Bruner v.
Seelbach Hotel Co., 133 Ky. 41, 49, 117 S.W. 373, 376 (1909).
19. "An essential element of negligence is a knowledge of facts which render
foresight possible . . ." per Green, J. in Hope v. Full Brook Coal Co. 3 App. Div.
70, 75, 38 N. Y. Supp. 1040, 1043 (4th Dep't 1896).
20. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REV. 1, 17(1927).
21. See Note, 23 MNN. L. REv. 628 (1938) for an exhaustive collection of
facts the individual is required to know; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 290 (1934).
22. See, e.g., HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 72 (1933); Doherty v. Arcade Hotel,
170 Ore. 374, 134 P. 2d 118 (1943).
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ought to have had at that time which is significant here. Clearly conduct
is to be judged in the light of all relevant knowledge which the actor ac-
tually then had,23 without regard to any external standard. If a man in
fact sees a half-hidden depression on a stairway or knows the properties
of a rare chemical combination, or remembers a dangerous curve in a road
he has not been over for many years, he will be held to that knowledge even
if a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances might not have ac-
quired or remembered it. Trouble may of course be encountered in the
matter of proof, but the theory can scarcely be doubted.
A further point should be noted. One of the things a man may know
is his own ignorance, and this in itself may often be found to call for pre-
cautions against possible but unknown danger. Thus, one who finds him-
self in a strange dark hallway must take precautions against possible "ob-
structions to his passage and pitfalls to his feet."
24
When we get beyond the realm of what the actor actually knew, the
problem is more complex and the authorities less harmonious, although
some propositions command wide support. Unless at least the actor has
a physical impairment of his senses or is insane or a child, he must be suf-
ficiently attentive to his surroundings to perceive what the reasonable man
would; 25 he will be held to see the obvious"0 and hear the clearly audi-
23. Thus a dealer in fur. coats with knowledge that some people are allergic
to a particular dye must take precautions which would be unnecessary had he
remained oblivious to that fact. Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45,
143 N.W. 48, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 224 (1913) (dictum). In Parrott v. Wells (The
Nitroglycerine Case), 15 Wall. 524 (U. S. 1872), what was held to be ordinary
care in the handling of a package would have been negligence had the actor known
the package contained nitroglycerine. In Smithline v. Hadigrian, 34 N. Y. S. 2d
509 (City Ct. N. Y. 1942), the plaintiff, having observed a janitress washing
marble stairs on his ascent, was held contributorily negligent for slipping on the
stairs upon descending a short time later.
24. Benton v. Watson, 231 Mass. 582, 121 N.E. 399 (1919); Plahn v. Masonic
Hall Bldg. Ass'n, 206 Minn. 232, 288 N.W. 575 (1939); Prokey v. Hamm, 91 N.H.
513, 23 A. 2d 327, 329 (driving with shimmy in front wheels-"Where knowledge is
necessary to careful conduct, voluntary ignorance is equivalent to negligence.");
Ouligan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287, 75 N.E. 726 (1905) (pouring cleaning solution
on spilled nitroglycerine and scrubbing with broom without determining effects of
solution on the nitroglycerine). RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 289, comment j.
25. For example, a reasonably prudent person would perceive the violence of
a wind and the consequent danger of descending an open stairway. Belcher v. City
and County of San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 457, 158 P. 2d 996 (1945). See RESTAT-
MENT, ToRTs § 289, comments g and e.
26. Oran v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 324 Ill. App. 463, 58 N.E. 2d 731
(1944) (failure to see two inch red reflecter on bicycle); Southern California
Freight Lines v. San Diego Electric Ry., 66 Cal. App. 2d 672, 152 P. 2d 470 (1944)
(plaintiff must look with seeing eyes); Stone v. Mullen, 257 Mass. 344, 153 N.E.
565 (1926) (plaintiff negligent as a matter of law in not seeing unlighted truck in
roadway where evidence showed that the truck was visible for. a hundred yards);
[Vol. 16
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ble.27. Even here, however, there is a good deal of room for subjective factors.
Not all situations call for the same degree of attentiveness on the part of
the standard man,28 and the question whether any given situation requires
special alertness may depend on the observer's past experience.2 Thus,
a driver who for any reason knows that a railroad runs through some un-
likely region may be required to use greater vigilance to discover a blind
grade crossing than one who is excusably ignorant of that fact. Knowledge
or experience of a specific fact like this is always individualized and the
actor will not be charged with it unless a reasonable man would have ac-
quired it, or unless the actor himself once knew it but negligently forgot it.
Memory is also judged objectively by the standard of the reasonably
prudent man. The normal adult is required to possess the ability to re-
member which a reasonably prudent man possesses both as to the character
of the phenomena which he must remember and as to the circumstances
under which he is required to remember them.3o An actor must keep in
Anderson v. Old Colony St. Ry., 214 Mass. 505, 101 N.E. 1072 (1913) (failure
of motorman to observe overhanging pole on wagon).
27. McClafferty v. Fisher, 1 Sadler 161, 2 Atl. 60 (Pa. 1885) (experienced
oil pumper held to have heard hissing of newly struck well and was therefore
negligent in approaching vicinity with lighted lantern).
28. "Every traveler upon a highway is bound to exercise the care of the
ordinarily prudent and cautious person under all circumstances. The degree of
vigilance and continuity of alertness necessary to attain that standard vary with
the time and place, surroundings and means of transportation." Commonwealth
v. Horsfall, 213 Mass. 232, 235, 100 N.E. 362, 363 (1913). See Lynch v. Fisk
Rubber Co., 209 Mass. 16, 95 N.E. 400 (1911), where the court held that it was
for the jury to determine whether the driver's inattention in conversingwith a
passenger was negligence under the circumstances. See RESTATEMENT, IORTS
289, comment k; Degnan v. Olson, 136 Conn. 171, 69 A. 2d 642 (1949).
There has perhaps been an increasing tendency to take account of what the
Pennsylvania court has aptly called "attention arresters." See Johnson v. Rulon,
363 Pa. 585, 70 A. 2d 325 (1950). Thus advertising matter, an attractive display
of wares, or even a menu on the wall, may be considered in deciding whether plain-
tiff, whose attention was thus diverted, was negligent in failing to see a dangerous
condition which would be obvious to one who looked towards it. The cases are
often ones where a customer sues a proprietor of business premises (who also
furnished the "attention arrester"). But the notion may be applicable to other
cases as well, so far as judging the reasonableness of plaintiff's conduct goes. Note,
2 ALA. L. REv. 373 (1950).
29. Davis v. Boston & M. R.R., 70 N. H. 519, 523, 49 Atl. 108 (1900) (plain-
tiff who saw train standing in station and knew from past experience that engine
would be sent to roundhouse was negligent in not looking behind him while
walking down the tracks to roundhouse). See RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 289, comment
n.
30. City of Charlottesville v. Jones, 123 Va. 682, 97 S.E. 316, 324 (1918)(upholding trial court's modification of defendant's request to charge on plaintiff's
negligence "provided an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances
would have remembered it.") See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 289, comment f.
In his very excellent article on this subject Professor Seavey suggests that
memory seems to be a purely mechanical process closely approaching the physical
7
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mind those things which would make an impression on the standard man.
As a general rule, forgetfulness is no excuse. 31 If the actor realizes that he
is by nature forgetful, he will be required to exercise his faculties to a higher
degree to compensate for this infirmity.32 The actor is excused only if the
cause of his lapse in memory was such as would induce forgetfulness in the
hypothetical standard man.33 The actor is usually excused if he is startled"'
or if there is sufficient reason for distracting his attention. If the actor
processes. He concludes that a subjective test should be applied, as it is with
physical shortcomings. This would not preclude the possibility of negligence in
forgetting a danger, for ". . if the actor once knew but subsequently forgot, his
liability would be based upon the answer to the question as to whether or not at
the time he forgot he should have anticipated that forgetting the fact might be
a cause of injury and whether the forgetting was due to a failure in his 'objective'
qualities." Seavey, op. cit., supra, n. 2, 20-22. If the reasoning be followed, should
not the critical time be the last time he thought of the danger before he forgot,
rather than "the time he forgot"? The fact that this line of reasoning leads to such
a question shows, it is submitted, that it is too precious for practical use even by
appellate courts (to say nothing of its helpfulness in instructing juriesl).
31. City of Charlottesville v. Jones, 123 Va. 682, 97 S.E. 317, 324 (1918).
In Coppins v. Jefferson, 126 Wis. 578, 105 N.W. 1078 (1905), it was said that for-
getting an obstruction in the highway created a presumption of negligence which,
however, yields .readily to any reasonable explanation. See also Collins v. City of
Janesville, 111 Wis. 348, 87 N.W. 241 (1901). In Ramos v. Service Bros., 118Cal. App. 432, 5 P. 2d 623, 624 (1931), the following instruction was upheld:
"One who works at a dangerous vocation, or one who voluntarily places himself
in a position of danger, cannot close his eyes to such danger or momentarily forget a
known danger, but is required to exercise a quantum of care that is commensurate
with such danger as may be known to him. And if he momentarily forgets such
known danger or closes his eyes to such danger, and is thereby injured, and the
proximate cause of his injury is his forgetfulness of such danger, or his failure
to make reasonable use of his faculties under. such circumstances, he cannot recover
for the injury."
32. Reynolds v. Los Angeles G. & E. Co., 162 Cal. 327, 122 Pac. 962, 39
L.R.A. (N.S.) 896 (1912) (75 year old woman held negligent for forgetting ex-
cavation in front of her house).
33. In Kitsap County Transportation Co. v. Harvey, 15 F. 2d 166, 48 A.L.R.
1420 (1926), the court excused the plaintiff's failure to remember that the seat
she occupied as a passenger on defendant's boat was raised above the level of the
aisle. "That people do in forgetfulness trip over unusual obstacles upon a floor
with which they are familiar, or stumble over unusual steps under like circum-
stances is a matter of common knowledge." (p. 168). In Deacy v. McDonnell,
131 Conn. 101, 38 A. 2d 181 (1944) it was held that a person who had been over a
step four times before might as a matter of fact be reasonable in forgetting it.
34. In Williams v. Ballard Lumber Co., 41 Wash. 338, 83 Pac. 323 (1906),
plaintiff's forgetfulness was excused when he was startled by the unexpected starting
of machinery under which he was working.
35. Kelly v. Blackstone, 147 Mass. 448, 18 N.E. 217, 9 Am. St. Rep. 730(1888) (elderly woman crossing street at night to avoid encountering strangers);
Weare v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 110 Mass. 334 (1872) (anxiety caused by
being called home suddenly to attend to children); Crites v .City of New Richmond,
98 Wis. 55, 73 N.W. 322 (1897) (distracted by friend's greeting); Cuminsky v.
City of Kenosha, 87 Wis. 286, 58 N.W. 395 (1894) (timid woman hurrying to
avoid meeting large group of men); West Ky. Tel. Co. v. Pharis, 25 Kv. L. Rep.
1838, 28 S.W. 917 (1904) (preoccupation with thought of sick sister); Houston v.
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1951], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/6
1951] REASONABLE MAN IN NEGLIGENCE CASES 9
has no legally acceptable excuse, he must remember for a reasonable length
of time. Older cases were often pretty strict in ruling that a lapse of memory
after a fairly short period was negligence as matter of law.", But the
tendency has probably been towards letting all but the most flagrant cases
go to the jury.37
The next problem concerns the extent to which a man will be held to
matters of common knowledge. To revert to our hypothetical driver who
encounters a blind grade crossing in a strange and remote territory, the
question still remains whether he is to be charged with the knowledge that
in this country of ours railroads are (or at least were) likely to be found
in the most unlikely places.3 s Probably every one will be treated as though
he knew certain fundamental facts and laws of nature which belong to uni-
versal human experience, such as the laws of gravity,83 the principles of
leverage, 40 the fact that water drowns,4 ' fire burns,42 and smoke suffocates.43
The actor is required to have certain knowledge concerning himself, such
Town of Waverly, 225 Ala. 98, 142 So. 80 (1932) (distracted by son on bicycle).
See 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 648 et. seq. for collection of cases. However, mere preoccupa-
tion is no excuse. Buckley v. Westchester Light Co., 73 App. Div. 436, 87 N. Y.
Supp. 763 (2nd Dep't 1904); nor curiosity-Davis v. California Street Cable Co.,
105 Cal. 131, 38 Pac. 647 (1894); nor forgetfulness due to a self-induced diversion,
such as engaging in a conversation-Bender v. Minden, 124 Iowa 685, 100 N.W.
352 (1904). Contra as to conversation-Wheeler v. Town of Westport, 30 Wis. 392
(1872).
36. Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303 (1878) (forgetting hole in floor after three
weeks excused); Wood v. Richmond & D. RR., 100 Ala. 660, 13 So. 552, 39 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 900 (1893) (forgetting pile of timber in 24 hours not excused).
37. See notes 30-36, supra.
38. Compare Piscitello v. N. Y., N. H., & H. R.R., 116 Conn. 638, 166 AtI.
61 (1933) (where the crossing should have been observed) with McClure v. Southern
P. Co., 41 Cal. App. 652, 183 Pac. 248 (1919) and Harwood v. Missouri P. R.R.,
118 Kan. 332, 234 Pac. 990 (1925) (where the court thought the traveler's failure to
notice it was excusable). Cases are collected in a note, 40 A.L.R. 1309 (1926). See
also 93 A.L,R. 218, 221 (1934).
39. Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Hackney, 217 Ala. 382, 115 So. 869, 874 (1928)
unbalanced railroad ties); Brown v. Swift & Co., 91 Neb. 532, 136 N.W. 726 (1912)
tendency of wheeled vehicle to roll down incline).
40. City of Huntingburg v. First, 15 Ind. App. 552, 43 N.E. 17 (1896)
(tendency of loose plank to tip when stepped on); Stobba v. Fitzsimmons, Con-
nell Co., 58 Ill. App. 427 (1895) (plaintiff standing on end of plank thrown in air
when derrick dropped lumber on other end).
41. City of Evansville v. Blue, 212 Ind. 130, 8 N.E. 2d 224 (1937) (11 year
old boy); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896) (11 year old boy).
42. Gates v. Boston & M. R.R., 255 Mass. 297, 151 N.E. 320 (1926) (burning
of railroad ties causing forest fire).
43. Lexington & E. Ry. v. White, 182 Ky. 267, 206 S.W. 467 (1918) (rail-
road running engines in rapid succession through tunnel in which plainitff was work-
ing).
9
James: James: Qualities of the Reasonable
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
as his ability to lift and carry heavy objects,4' the equilibrium of his body,45
the amount of space he occupies,4 and certain elementary rules of personal
hygiene.'4 He is also treated as though he knows the law.48
In addition, people who have had an ordinary amount of exposure to
the facts of modern life in America will be treated as though they know
many other things. The normal adult is held to have knowledge of the
characteristics of animals common to his community, such as the proneness
of mules to kick,49 the viciousness of bulls, 50 and the propensity of mad dogs
to bite.', He is also required to be acquainted with the natural propensities
44. "Every man will be presumed to know more about his own strength and
to be better informed as to his ability to lift than is a stranger" per Griffin Smith,
Chi. J. in Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Vinson, 196 Ark. .500, 118 S.W. 2d 672 (1938)(rupture from stacking railroad ties); Sweeney v. Winebaum, 84 N. H. 217, 149 Atd.
77 (1930) (plaintiff suffering from tuberculosis strained while carrying heavy load);
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Sawyers, 169 Ky. 671, 184 S.W. 1123 (1916).
45. In Sharpe v. Higbee Co., 56 Ohio App. 278, 10 N.E. 2d 932, 933 (1936), the
court upheld the following charge: "The court says to you as a matter of law,
ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that the question of balance of an individual
is entirely within the individual. If you find that the plaintiff sustained her accident
as a direct result of the losing of her balance, at the time complained of, your
verdict herein should be in favor of the defendant." See also Hesse v. National
Casket Co., 66 N.J.L. 652, 52 At. 384 (1902) (16 year old boy held to know like-
lihood of falling from bench if he moved too far from its center of gravity).
46. Jennings v. Tacoma Ry. & Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275, 34 Pac. 937 (1893)(attempt by plaintiff to squeeze body through space 3%/ inches wide).
47. "In these modem days the child in the public school is taught the lessons
of hygiene gathered by the scientific investigators. In this country the knowledge
of the school child is the knowledge of the public... ." per Graves, J. in Valley Spring
Hog Ranch Co. v. Plagmann, 282 Mo. 1, 10, 220 S.W. 1, 15 A.L.R. 266 (1920).
See Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Woods, 205 Ark. 131, 162 S.W. 2d 869 (1943)(moldy food unfit for consumption); Jurovich v. Interstate Iron Co., 181 Minn.588, 233 N.W. 465 (1930) ("Ignorance and inexperience cannot be so great as not
to appreciate the physical hazards of working in ice cold water"); Hicks v South-
em Ry., 23 Ga. App. 594, 99 S.E. 218 (1919) (the results of eposure in a coldroom).48. Mazza v. Greenstein, 80 N.E. 2d 216 (Ohio App. 1948) (that motorist en-
tering public street from private driveway must yield right of way); Rodgers v.Cox, 130 Conn. 616, 36 A. 2d 373 (1944); Dow v. Brown, 193 So. 239 (La. App.
1939) (yielding right of way at intersection). But cf. Evers v. Davis, 86 N.J.L.
196, 90 Atl. 677 (1914); James, Statutory Standards & Negligence in Accident
Cases, 11 Lb.. L. Ray. 95, 118 (1950).49. Tolin v. Terrell, 133 Ky. 210, 117 S.W. 290 (1903); Borden v. Falk, 97
Mo. App. 566, 71 S.W. 478 (1903) (viciousness and treacherousness of mules).
50. Gacone v. State, 173 Misc. 367, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 161 (Ct. Cl. 1940)tr,
HaaCk v. Rodenbour, 234 Iowa 368, 12 N.W. 2d 861 (1944) (especially during breed-
ing season).
51. Brune v. DeBenedette, 261 S.W. 930 (Mo. App. 1924); Clinkenbeard v.
Reinert, 284 Mo. 569, 225 S.W. 667, 13 A.L.R. 485. (1920). Also, the viciousness
of stallions-Hammond v. Melton, 42 Ill. App. 186 (1891). Cf. Garcia v. Sumrall,
58 Ariz. 526, 121 P. 2d 640 (1942) (discussions of the notorious propensity of
grazing animals to wander in search of food and water).
[Vol. 16
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of children,52 the dangers incident to common sports, 3 and the elements of
the weather to which he is accustomed. 54 As the complexity of his civiliza-
tion increases, the actor is required to possess an ever increasing store of
knowledge of scientific facts; such as the dangerous properties of electricity,5"
the hazards involved in revolving machinery, 6 the dangerous properties of
certain chemicals, 57 and the inflammability of petroleum.58  The dangers
inherent in common modes of travel,59 the perils involved in handling fire-
arms,60 the intoxicating qualities of alcoholic beverages, 61 and the physical
characteristics of common substances. These rules have often been re-
52. Such as their heedlessness-Femling v. Star Publication Co., 195 Wash.
395, 81 P. 2d 293 (1938); the attractiveness of ponds of water-Davoren v. Kansas
City, 308 Mo. 513, 273 S.W. 401, 40 A.L.R. 473 (1925); the attractiveness of
dangerous objects such as explosives-Wellman v. Fordson Coal Co., 105 W. Va.
463, 143 S.E. 160 (1928); childish impulses-Louisville & N. R.R. v. Vaughn, 292
Ky. 120, 166 S.W. 2d 43 (1943); climbing propensity-Deaton's Adm'r v. Ken-
tucky & West Virginia Power Co., 291 Ky. 304, 164 S.W. 2d 468 (1942); propensity
of small children to wander into streets-Agdeppa v. Glougie, 71 Cal. App. 2d 463,
162 P. 2d 944 (1945).
53. Baseball-Keys v. Almo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W. 2d 368 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941); Hummel v. Columbus Baseball Club, 71 Ohio App. 321, 49 N.E. 2d 773(1943); hockey-Ingersall v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N. Y.
Supp. 505 (3d Dep't 1935). Contra: Thurman v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal. App. 2d
364, 97 P. 2d 999 (1939); Shanney v. Boston Madison Sq. G. Corp., 296 Mass. 168,
5 N.E. 2d 1 (1936). See notes, 10 So. CAL. L. REv. 67 (1936); 17 B.U.L. REv.
485 (1937).
54. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Thompson, 171 Md. 460, 189 Atl.
822 (1937) (the fog in Baltimore); Staples v. City of Spencer, 222 Iowa 1241, 271
N.W. 200 (1937) (ice formations); Olson v. McMullen, 34 Minn. 94, 24 N.W. 318
(1885) (effect of thawing frost on embankment).
55 . Roland v. Griffith, 291 Ky. 248, 163 S.W. 2d 496 (1942); LeVonas v.
Acme Paper Board Co., 184 Md. 16, 40 A. 2d 43 (1944) (that any line carrying
electricity is dangerous).
56. Such as saws-Gaertner v. Schmitt, 21 App. Div. 403, 47 N. Y. Supp. 521,
44 L.R.A. 52n (1st Dep't 1897); cogs-Ruchinski v. French, 168 Mass. 68, 46
N.E. 417 (1897); fans-Dillinberger v. Weingartner, 64 N.J.L. 292, 45 Atl. 638(1900); set-screw on revolving shaft-American Malting Co. v. Lelivelt, 101 In.
App. 320 (1902).
57. Such as explosives-Commanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co.,
298 S.W. 554 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927). But not the identity of explosives-
Parrott v. Wells (The Nitroglycerine Case), 15 Wall. 524 (U. s. 1872). That lye
bums-Schultz v. Klinabren, 177 So. 450 (La. App. 1937).
58. Parton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 Mo. App. 585, 107 S.W. 2d 167(1937) (kerosene); Burnett v. Amalgamated Phosphate Co., 96 F. 2d 974 (C.C.A.
5th 1938) (gasoline); Simpkins v. R. L. Morrison & Sons, 107 F. 2d 121 (C.C.A. 5th
1939) (gasoline fumes).
.59. Such as the dangers of boarding a train-Murphy v. Pere Marquette R.R.,
183 Mich. 435, 150 N.W. 122 (1914); descending from train-L.S. & M.S. Ry. v.
Bangs, 47 Mich. 470, 11 N.W. 276 (1882); that skidding on wet surface increases
with speed-Wolfe v. State for use of Brown, 173 Md. 103, 194 AtI. 832 (1937);
that overcrowding of the driver's seat impairs control of automobile-McIntyre v.
Pope, 326 Pa. 172, 191 Atl. 607 (1937).
60. McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa. St. 584, 119 Atl. 721 (1923).
61. Cf. Osbom v. Leuffgen, 381 Ill. 295, 45 N.E. 2d 622 (1943).
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ferred to as presumptions. Certainly they reflect what is generally the fact
and may at least be taken as true, in the first instance, without proof.0 2
But occasionally the law has gone further either for reasons of administrative
convenience or of policy, and has crystallized the rule in some situations
so as to preclude proof in rebuttal so that irone insists on speaking on terms
of presumptions, he will call these "conclusive." Since credible proof of
this nature is so seldom offered, and since the courts often employ confus-
ing language, it cannot be told whether the rule is substantive, in many
instances, or simply a rejection of proffered evidence as unworthy of belief.
Nor does it usually matter, since in any event the actor will be held bound
to acquire the knowledge and experience which a reasonable man would
have concerning the world about him. It is only where he is a stranger
or in some way has had an unusually limited background that the dis-
tinction becomes important, and where that is the case it will probably be
found that genuine and reasonable ignorance will be considered in all but a
very few situations.6 s But even where it is, the actor must realize his ig-
norance and take precautions suitable in the light of it, if the man of stand-
ard intelligence and judgment could appreciate that the situation made the
ignorance dangerous0 4
In addition to the knowledge and experience with which people generally
will be charged in conducting the ordinary affairs of life, men who engage
in certain activities or come into certain relationships with people or things
are under peculiar obligation to acquire knowledge and experience about
that activity, person, or thing. As it has aptly been put, every man is re-
quired to have knowledge of "the quality of his beast."60 Thus, an occupier
of land owes a duty to business visitors" to know of dangerous conditions
of the premises which could be discovered by reasonable inspection;G1 the
62. Terry has pointed out the possible source of confusing the substantive rule
with this question of proof. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 50 (1915).
63. "Thus a hermit hearing, without explanation, a radio for the first time, of
a savage, suddenly dropped from his native swamps into the streets of New York,
cannot be judged except with reference to what he knows." Seavey, op. cit. srupra,
p. 19. See Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. .596, 49 N.E. 1010, 40 L.R.A. 347 (1897),
where a Spanish woman stepped into a coal hole in Boston. Although the court
didn't consider her contributory negligence, the langu~age indicated that, had they
considered it, they would have taken into account her ignorance.
64. Michigan City v. Rudolph, 104 Ind. App. 643, 12 N.E. 2d 970 (1938)
(driving in sand when unaccustomed to doing so); Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv.
L. Rzv. 40, 48 (1915); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 289 j.
65. Hale, P. C. 430, quoted by Maxey, J. in Pope v. Reading Co., 304 Pa. 326,
333, 156 At. 106, 107 (1931).
66. PROSSER, ToRTs § 79 (1941).
67. Falkenberry v. Shaw, 183 Ark. 1019, 39 S.W. 2d 708 (1931).
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carrier owes to his passengers the duty of discovering all detectable defects; "s
the landlord who furnishes appliances for his tenants is required to find out
about the risks they entail;6" and the manufacturer must learn of dangers
that lurk in his processes and his products. Thus, when a purchaser of per-
fume suffered a second degree burn from the perfume, a Massachusetts court
recently imputed to the maker knowledge of the harmful nature of the
offending ingredient.70 A New York court held that a dress manufacturer
should realize the fire risk involved in treating an evening gown with nitro-
cellulose.71 A barber was held bound to know that using a vibrator over the
closed eye might cause detachment of the retina.7 2 Traditionally the profes-
sional man has had to keep reasonably abreast of current advances in his
field.73
As scientific knowledge advances, more risks can be discovered and
avoided. Those who deal with matters affected by these advances must
keep reasonably abreast of them. What is excusable ignorance today may
be negligence tomorrow. In the last century little was known of allergies
and a manufacturer could scarcely be charged with knowledge that chrome
mordanted stockings might produce ulceration.7" Today the manufacturer
68. Central of Georgia R. R. v. Robertson, 203 Ala. 358, 83 So. 102 (1919).
69. Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N. H. 415, 135 Ad. 20, 52 A.L.R. 858 (1926)(landlord installing gas water heater in bathroom used by his tenants charged with
knowledge of the danger of monoxide poisoning due to inadequate installation).
But he need use only reasonable care to make such discoveries. Doherty v. Arcade
Hotel, n. 22 supra, (innkeeper not as matter of law bound to know about dangers
of porcelain faucets within 3 % years after their abandonment in plumbing trade).
70. Carter v. Yardley & Co., Ltd., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E. 2d 693, 164 A.L.R.
559 (1946).
71. Noone v. Fred Perlberg, 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (1st
Dep't 1944), aff'. 294 N. Y. 680, 60 N.E. 2d 839 (1945). Dayton v. Harlene
Frocks, 274 App. Div. 1015, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 614 (3d Dep't 1948).
72. Combrooks v. Terminal Barber Shops, 282 N. Y. 217, 26 N.E. 2d 25(1940). In Zesch v. The Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W. 2d
140, 156 A.L.R. 469 (1944) the company was held to have knowledge of a defect
in a grinding wheel although they possessed no instruments capable of discovering
the defect, on the ground that such an inspection was reasonable. In Air Reduction
Co. v. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co., 14 F. 2d 734 (C.C.A. 2d 1926) a company
supplying high pressure oxygen discharge manifolds was held to knowledge of the
dangers involved in using steel in the manifold. For collection of cases and dis-
cussion of the duty of an employer to know of dangers lurking in dangerous in-
strumentalities placed in the hands of his servants, see Grammar v. Mid-Continent
Petroleum Corp., 71 F. 2d 38, 41 (C.C.A. 10th 1934).
73. Sinz v. Owens, 196 P. 2d 52 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948). "The duty
imposed on a physician or surgeon is to employ such reasonable skill and diligence
as is ordinarily exercised in his profession in the same general neighborhood having
due regard to the advanced state of the profession at the time of the treatment."
-McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 395, 399 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
74. Gould v. Slater Woolen Co., 147 Mass. 315, 17 N.E. 531 (1888).
13
James: James: Qualities of the Reasonable
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
must acquire knowledge of such things. TM Only a few years ago there was
no way to detect a transnase fissure in a steel rail.70 Today this can be
done by the Sperry Detector car,77 and the conduct of railroads will be
judged in the light of this fact.7T As techniques for detecting accident
proneness becomes perfected, employers will have to take account of them
so as to remove accident prone employees from posts of danger.
Perception of the risk is the sum of all that has heretofore been dealt
with in this section. It is the correlation of past experience with the
specific facts in a situation. If a reasonable man with the actor's own
knowledge and experience plus the knowledge and experience with which
he is charged would perceive a risk in the conduct in question the actor
will be held to perceiving that risk. The courts, of course, set the outer
boundary to what a man may reasonably be held to foresee. But a judg-
ment upon this question, in the nature of things, may be exercised within
wide limits, and this is one of the focal points where the concept of negli-
gence is being expanded. Not only have the scientific advances noted above
enlarged the scope of what a jury may find to be foreseeable, but a quicken-
ing social conscience and the general trend towards wider liability have
led the courts to perceive risks in ordinary activities of men where not
so long ago they ruled them out of the permissible range of what might
be found."
75. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills [1936] A.C. 85, 9 Australian L. J.
288, 352 (1935) (free sulfite in underwear causing dermatitis).
76. Central of Georgia R.R. v. Robertson, 203 Ala. 358, 83 So. 102 (1919);
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Baker, 149 Va. 549, 141 S.E. 753 (1928).
77. N. Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1941, p. 7, col. 6.
78. "Cariers are under the highest duty to provide and maintain suitable
and safe equipment and appliances; their safety should be established by the very
best and surest tests recognized by experts in the business, and nothing can exempt
them from liability for defects therein except that they are latent ones which no
reasonable degree of skill and diligence would discover or prevent . . .They are
required to keep pace with the science and art of their business . . ." per Mayfield,
J, in Central of Georgia R. R. v. Robertson, supra n. 76 at p. 104.
79. An example of this is the increasing tendency of courts to hold defendants
to foresee the negligent or criminal acts of third persons. For example, a railroad
in whose station hoboes were accustomed to loiter was held negligent in failing
to provide guards to prevent assaults on women passengers-.Neering v. Illinois
Cent. R. R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E. 2d 497 (1943). In Nuss. v. State, 87 N. Y. S.
2d 592 (N. Y. Ct. 1949), the state of New York was held to have foreseen the pos-
sibility of a motorist failing to obey a stop sign. See also Kientz v. Charles Dennery,
17 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 1944) (truck driver with green light in his favor negligent
in not seeing automobile speeding negligently towards intersection.). The older
attitude is reflected in HOLMES POLLOCK LEMrrms 34-38 (Howe ed. 1941).
In McPortland v. State, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 665 (3d Dep't 1950) it is suggested that
the only change in liability for negligence is that which reflects increasing knowl-
edge, but this is an oversimplification.
[Vol. 16
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One further matter may be brought up appropriately here. Not all
of a man's conscious sensations and beliefs accurately reflect objective
reality. But even his mistaken impressions and beliefs are to be taken into
account in judging a man's conduct, and allowance will be made for them
provided they are not unreasonable in the light of his background and
experience1s
SKILL
Skill may be defined as "that special competence which is not part
of the ordinary equipment of the reasonable man, but which is the result
of aptitude developed by special training and experience." s ' In the life
of today the number of activities which are regarded as calling for special
skill is ever increasing,2 and correlatively the skills themselves and the
methods of teaching them are constantly being improved and developed.
According to the prevailing American view the standard for skill is largely
objective.83 The trend seems to be towards requiring the actor to exercise
the degree of skill which the general class of persons engaged in that line
of activity have. He must for example act as would the reasonably com-
petent and experienced automobile driver," or engineer,85 or dentist"B if
he is engaged in driving an automobile or a locomotive or in fixing teeth .
80. Blood v. Tyngsborough, 103 Mass. 509 (1870).
81. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 299, comment a. Skill obviously may include
special knowledge. "The practical and familiar knowledge of the principles and
processes of an art, science or trade combined with the ability to apply them in
practice in a proper and approved manner and with readiness and dexterity."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY p. 1634 (3d ed. 1933). It will be seen, therefore, that
this section and the last one overlap.
82. Thus, for example, Pennsylvania requires that persons pursuing the fol-
lowing callings be licensed: architects, bakery operators, barbers, beauty culturists,
dental hygienists, dentists, detectives, employment agents, engineers, innkeepers, in-
surance adjusters, lawyers, midwives, nurses, optometrists, osteopaths, pawnbrokers,
pharmacists, physicians and surgeons, pilots, plumbers, real estate brokers, master
stevedores, surveyors, undertakers and veterinarians. PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 63
(Purdon's, 1941).
83. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 299. Contra: Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or
Objective?, 41 H~av. L. REv. 1, 26 (1927).
84. Borgstede v. Walbauer, 337 Mo. 1205, 88 S.W. 2d 373, 375 (1935).
85. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Perry's Adm'r, 173 Ky. 213, 190 S.W. 1064 (1917).
86. Donathan v. McConnell, 193 P. 2d 819 (Mont. 1948); Vigneault v. Dr.
ffewson Dental Co., 300 Mass. 223, 15 N.E. 2d 185 (1938).
87. While earlier formulations of occupational standards of skill were con-
fined to professional people, such as doctors-see Note, 29 COL. L. REv. 985 (1929)
for collection of cases; lawyers-McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 132 Atl.
102 (1926); accountants-Smith v. London Assur. Corp., 109 App. Div. 882,
96 N. Y. Supp. 820 (2d Dep't 1905); recent developments have been in the direction
of gradually working down from those engaged in highly skilled occupations to the
semi-skilled trades. See for example Jackson v. Central Torpedo Co., 117 Okla.,
245, 246 Pac. 426 (1926) (oil well shooter); Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Waldrop,
237 Ala. 208, 186 So. 1S1 (1939) (restauranteur).
195 1
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Another form of statement which comes to the same thing is that he must
exercise the skill that a reasonably prudent man would have if he attempted
to do any of these things.8 Some authorities seek to justify this result on
the theory that the actor has held himself out as having the requisite skill
and will be treated accordingly1 9 This analysis may be appropriate enough
as between people who have come into some voluntary relationship with
each other (as carrier and passenger, doctor and patient, barber and cus-
tomer). But it is fictitious and not helpful if applied between strangers
such as different motorists on the highway, or a railroad and a trespasser
on its right of way. In such situations the "%olding out" explanation is
reminiscent of the fact that all tort duties could by a tour de force and
fictitious logic be reduced to implied undertakings, if one insisted in reason-
ing that way.
Still another approach, sometimes urged, would be subjective; i.e.,
it would judge a man's acts in the light of the skill he actually possesses.
Under this analysis, the unskilled driver who failed to fulfill the objective
test but did the best he could would be liable if at all only because he
undertook to drive when the reasonable man would know that he lacked
the skill to do so safely. In many cases this reasoning too will lead to the
same result as would the adoption of an objective test of skill. But in
the case of the novice it will not, for a person can scarcely be negligent
simply for trying to learn.
The skill required of a beginner is an increasingly difficult problem
in our modern society. "No one is born with skill. Everyone must ac-
quire it gradually. There must always be beginners." 0 And in general
we need to encourage them. Recent scientific studies, however, have con-
firmed what common sense suggests-that beginners in dangerous pursuits
cause far more than their share of accidents."' Obviously this would be
largely just because of that lack of skill for which a subjective standard
would make allowance The social need for compensating the victims of
this over-hazardous group is surely just as great as that of compensating
88. SALMOND, TORTS 31 (10th ed. 1947).
89. "In those employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his
services he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree
of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment." Smith v. London
Assur. Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. Supp. 820 (2nd. Dep't 1905); Seavey,
op. cit. supra note 83, p. 26.
90. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L. REV. 1, 27(1927).
91. HERBERT MOORE, PSYCHOLOGY FOR BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 359 (2d. ed.
1942); J. TIFFINS, INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY 294-97 (1942).
[Vol. 16
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the victims of experienced actors. The only problem is whether it is un-
just or inexpedient to impose the burden of compensating them on the
beginner or, as is generally the case, on his employer or, among those who
pay premiums to his insurance carrier. Essentially the same problem has
been treated elsewhere.12 The practical answer which the weight of Ameri-
can authority has made to it here is to hold the beginner to an external
standard, i.e., the standard of those who are reasonably skilled and ex-
perienced regardless of the precautions taken to safeguard the learning
process.93  As a corrollary of this objective standard, the beginner will not
be negligent if his external conduct is that which would be reasonable in a
reasonably skilled operator.9 4 On the other hand, the standard for skill
is subjective to this extent. If an actor has more than reasonable skill,
he must probably exercise that which he has.95 And no doubt in excep-
tional cases like emergencies in which a reasonable man would do the best
he could even without skill, the actor's conduct will be judged in the light
of that fact.9 6
PHYSICAL, MENTAL, AND EMOTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The subjective standard finds its most complete acceptance in the case
of physical characteristics. In general, it may be said that the physically
handicapped person must act as a reasonably prudent person would if he
suffered from the disabilities of the actor. However, the emphasis laid upon
92. James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63. HARV.
L. REv. 769, 782 et. seq. (1950).
93. Holland v. Pitocchelli, 299 Mass. p54, 13 N.E. 2d 390 (1938) (picking
isolated spot in the country to learn to drive. Contrast this with RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 299, comment b); Goff v. Hubbard, 217 Ky. 729, 290 S.W. 696, 50 A.L.R.
1382 (1927) (driving under dealer's tutelage); Hughey v. Lennox, 142 Ark. 593,
219 S.W. 323 (1920) (upholding the following instruction: "he must possess reason-
able skill in operating an automobile before he undertakes to operate said automobile
upon the public thoroughfares or highways; if he fails to possess reasonable skill
in operating the car or fails to exercise due care in operation of the car, that con-
stitutes negligence." (at p. 325).
In Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267 (1926), the inexperienced
defendant was held not liable to his guest for injuries on the ground that plaintiff
had assumed the risk of defendant's known inexperience. The assumption of the
risk argument would not apply to a stranger. In Holland v. Pitocchelli, supra, the
court held the defendant liable in the face of the contention that the plaintiff had
assumed the risk of her unskilled driving. See Morris, The Role of Expert Testir-
mony in the Trial of Negligence Issues, 26 TEx. L. REV. 1, 18 (1947).
94. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 299, comment b.
95. Harriss v. Fall, 177 Fed. 79 (C.C.A. 10th 1910) (his own best ability,
skill and care); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 299, comments b, d, f.
96. "The circumstances which justify the actor in so doing are those which
would cause a reasonable man to believe that the good which he is likely to ac-
complish by so doing counterbalances the risk that his lack of skill will do harm."
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 299, comment e.
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physical infirmities varies among courts. The majority American view
holds that the jury should be instructed to consider what a reasonably
prudent man would do under the circumstances-the physical handicap
constituting part of the circumstances.97 The minority charge the jury
to consider the actor's conduct in the light of what a reasonably prudent
man with a like infirmity would do.98  The difference is merely one of
language.99 It is often said that the physically handicapped should exer-
cise a higher degree of care than that required of the ordinarily prudent
person,100 but this requirement usually means merely that a handicapped
person must often take precautions to compensate for his infirmities that
would not otherwise be required of a reasonable man.10 ' A blind man will
not be required to see, though he may perhaps have to use his other senses
more sharply than one who can. Some courts, however, have been explicit
97. McLaughlin v. Griffin, 155 Ia. 302, 135 N.W. 1107 (1912); Balcom v. City
of Independence, 178 Ia. 685, 160 N.W. 305 (1916); Apperson v. Lazro, 44 Ind.
App. 186, 87 N.E. 97 (1909). RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 289.
98. Ham v. Lewiston, 94 Me. 265, 47 At]. 548 (1900); Carter v. Village of
Nunda, -53 App. Div. 501, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (4th Dep't 1900); Weinstein v.
Wheeler, 27 Ore. 406, 271 Pac. 733 (1928). In Wray v. Fairfield Amusement Co.,
126 Conn. 221, 10 A. 2d 600 (1940), the court upheld a charge instructing thejury that a person suffering from a bone condition was required to exercise such
care as a reasonably prudent person suffering from that condition would exercise.
See also Jones v. Bayler, 49 Cal. App. 2d 647, 122 P. 2d 293 (1942) (a person with
faculties so impaired); Muse v. Page, 125 Conn. 219, 4 A.'2d 329 (1939) (near-
sighted must use such care as an ordinarily prudent person with a like infirmity
would exercise under similar circumstances).
99. See Note, 30 Ky. L. J. 220, 221 (1941). Although the extent to which
instructions from the bench influence the jury in reaching their decision is largely
conjectural, there is usually a controversy between the opposing lawyers concerning
the degree of emphasis given physical handicaps in the charge. The claim that
too much or too little stress was placed on the actor's physical characteristics is
often a ground for appeal. See for example, Charbonneau v. Macrury, 84 N. H. 501,
153 Atl. 457, 73 A.L.R. 1266 (1931) where it was urged, unsuccessfully, that it was
error to refer to the factors of a child's age and experience as constituting thd
standard of conduct.
100. In Karl v. Juniata County, 206 Pa. 633, 56 Atl. 78 (1903), the following
charge was upheld: "That if the jury believe from the evidence that the eyesight
of John Karl, the plaintiff, was impaired on the night of the accident, the law
required a degree of care upon his part beyond the usual and ordinary, proportioned
to the degree of his impairment of vision." In Armstrong v. Warner Bros. Theatres
Inc., 161 Pa. Super. 285, 54 A. 2d 831 (1947), the court pointed out that a woman
seventy-five years old was required to exercise greater vigilance because of her
age. See also Winn v. City of Lowell, 1 Allen 177 (Mass. 1861); Carroll v. Chicago
B. & Q. R.R., 142 IlL. App. 195 (1900).
101. In Keith v. Worcester & Blackstone Valley St. Ry., 196 Mass. 478, 82 N.E.
680, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 648 (1907), the standard of conduct was held to be the
same for a near-sighted woman as a normal woman, but she was required to put
forth a greater effort to attain the standard. See also Jones v. Bayley, 49 Cal. App.
2d 647, 122 P. 2d 293 (1943).
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in their demand that the infirm must exercise a higher than ordinary degree
of care.10 2
As we have just noted, persons who know that their faculties are im-
paired must conduct themselves as the reasonable man would in the light
of such infirmities.10° In extreme cases a court or jury may find that this
would mean refraining from certain activities altogether. No doubt a
blind man would be negligent as a matter of law in trying to drive a car.
But such decisions are fraught with such serious social and political impli-
cations in our country where individual freedom in general is still greatly
prized and where freedom to engage in the most dangerous activity of all
(drive a car) is so much bound up in the way of life and even the self
respect of most of us, that except in the clearest cases courts have wisely
left these decisions to be made by the political process. Statute apart,
therefore a man with one leg and one arm may drive a car and the blind
may walk the streets unattended without being negligent if he employs
the safeguards which the reasonably prudent person with that infirmity
would if he engaged in that activity °4
Loss of consciousness through sleep, illness, or the like is to be taken
into account and, because negligence presupposes a voluntary act,105 the
102. Where a blind man was injured by falling in a ditch, the court instructed
the jury that ordinary care for a blind man is higher care than that required for a
person in full possession of his faculties-Foy v. Winston 126 N.C. 381, 35 S.E. 609
(1900). In Marks Adm'r v. Petersburg RR., 88 Va. 1, 13 S.E. 299 (1891) a woman
blind in one eye was held guilty of contributory negligence for failure to take greater
than ordinary precautions. Contra: Jones v. Bayley supra., where the court was
upheld in refusing an instruction requiring greater than ordinary care of a person
with impared faculties; Rosenthal v. Chicago and A. RR., 255 Ill. 552, 99 N.E.,
672 (1912) (no higher degree of care than if there were no infirmity); Hill v. Glen-
wood, 124 Iowa, 479, 100 N.W. 522 (1904) (semble).
103. Thus where a streetcar motorman experienced two dizzy spells but con-
tinued to run the streetcar until he fainted, a judgment for the defendant was
reversed on the ground that the motorman had warning, and, therefore, knowledge
of the attack-Goldman v. N.Y.R.R., 185 App. Div. 739, 173 N. Y. Supp. 737 (1st
Dep't 1919). But where the actor had no knowledge that her knee was weak,
she could not be required to exercise greater care-Greenlee v. City of Belle
Plain, 204 Iowa 1055, 216 N.W. 774 (1927).
104. This problem is to be distinguished from the question of the care which
should be taken by others towards persons with physical infirmities.
105. "He must have done that which he ought not to have done or omitted
that which he ought to have done, as a conscious being endowed with a will ...
Nowhere in cases dealing with the subject of torts do we find the suggestion
that a person should be held responsible for injuries inflicted during periods of un-
consciousness." per Barnes, J., in Lobert v. Pack, 337 Pa. 103, 9 A. 2d 365 (1939)(guest while asleep kicked driver causing him to lose control). See also Welden
Tool Co. v. Kelley, 76 N.E. 2d 629 (Ohio App. 1947) (defendant motorist excused
when he blacked out); Cohen v. Petty, 62 App. D. C. 187, 65 F. 2d 820 (1933)(illness); See Holmes v. McNeil, 356 Mo. 846, 848, 204 S.W. 2d 303 (1947).
In a recent article, the authors very persuasively contend for a different rule.
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actor cannot be negligent for what he does or fails to do while he is un-
conscious. Usually, however, sleep does not come on a man without warn-
ing, and he will be negligent if he fails to heed the warning in the way
that a reasonable man would. 0 6 The same may be true of a fainting spell
or other seizure. Moreover, a man who suffers such an attack often has
had them before, and where that is so he must take such account of his
susceptibility as a reasonable man would. 107 Involuntary intoxication (if
a case of it were ever presented!) should stand on the same footing and
allowance should be made for the partial or total impairment of faculties
which it induced. Voluntary intoxication, however, is generally said to
be no excuse for acts or omissions which fail to conform to the conduct of
a reasonable and sober man,108 though it does not in the absence of statute
Kaufman and Kantrowitz, The Case of the Sleeping Motorist, 25 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv.
362 (1950). This article concedes that the driver's conduct should generally be
tested by the fault principle. "But" it is urged "when he goes insane, faints, or
falls asleep while propelling his automobile along the highway, he ceases to be a
driver. The risks of ceasing to be a driver while his car goes rolling along should'
be borne by him and not by the hapless individual who gets hit. The driverless, but
moving automobile is a mechanized wild beast. Responsibility for the harms
caused by the involuntary abandonment of an automobile ferae naturae should
be in the one from whose leash the beast has escaped."
An appendix to this article contains a valuable collection of cases on this
subject. I confess that for my part I am quite won over by the authors' position.
106. Baird v. Baird, 223 N. C. 730, 28 S.E. 2d 22$ (1943). In Diamond State
Tele. Co. v. Hunter, 41 Dela. 336, 21 A. 2d 286 (1941), the court held that the
mere fact of going to sleep while driving created a rebuttable presumption of
negligence.
107. Goldman v. N. Y. R.R., supra., n. 103; Weldon Tool Co. v. Kelley, supra,
n. 105. In Waters v. Pacific Coast Dairy Inc., 55 Cal. App. 2d 789, 131 P. 2d 588
(1942), the court held that the failure of the defendant to come forward and
show nature of attack causing loss of control and to prove that he had no reason
to anticipate the attack meant that the defendant had failed to establish his con-
duct as that of a reasonably prudent man.
108. Straughan's Adm'r v. Fendly, 301 Ky. 209, 191 S.W. 2d 391 (1945);
McMichael v. Pennsylvania R. R., 331 Pa. 584, 1 A. 2d 242 (1938); Scott v. Gardner,
137 Tex. 628, 156 S.W. 2d 513 (1941) (applies whether plaintiff or defendant).
Sometimes it is said that the negligence consists in getting drunk. But that
does not always involve unreasonable risk of harm. Suppose, for instance, that two
or three men with no car or firearms were getting quietly and good-naturedly drunk
in an isolated cabin on a fishing trip, and that the only driver in the lonely farm
house nearby, which had no telephone and is at the end of a dirt road 10 miles from
the nearest neighbor, is taken suddenly and seriously ill. Would it be negligent for
the least drunk fisherman to drive the farmer to the hospital, and if he did so,
should not he be judged by the standard of the reasonably prudent drunken man
(at least in the absence of statute or where statutory breach is treated as only
evidence of negligence)?
While the rule about drunkenness is pretty clear, the reasoning is not. The
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itself constitute negligence where it does not bring about such acts or
omissions 09
The overwhelming majority of the cases which involve a consideration
of the physical characteristics of the actor are concerned with handicapped
plaintiffs.11° It is a source of wonder why the infirmities of defendants are
brought out for consideration in so few instances. 1 - Usually, consideration
by the court of his physical condition aids recovery for an infirm plaintiff
whose conduct might otherwise be considered negligent. Thus, the harsh-
ness of the doctrine of contributory negligence is actually mitigated for one
class of the injured. While a subjective treatment of physical character-
istics is perfectly consistent logically with an attempt to refine the fault
principle, it is highly significant that such a treatment actually operates to
assure the injured party of compensation rather than to allow the defendant
to escape liability.
As far as mental and emotional characteristics are concerned, the
prevailing view is that the jury will be told to apply an objective test," 2
that is to hold the actor to the intelligence and stability of the standard
man, though it is a little hard to believe they will always faithfully heed the
admonition."t1 As we have seen, recent studies have shown that while
109. Emeryv. Los Angeles R. Corp., 61 Cal. App. 2d 455, 143 P. 2d 112 (1943);
Gerst v. Moore, 58 Ida. 149, 70 P. 2d 403 (1937) (same degree of care as person
not intoxicated); Remmenga v. Selk, 150 Neb. 401, 34 N.W. 2d 757 (1948) (care
of ordinarily prudent sober person). But where plaintiff's intoxication was the
direct cause of the injury, he has been held contributorily negligent as a matter
of law.
110. A breakdown of the types of physical defects which were brought to the
court's attention by plaintiffs attempting to escape contributory negligence shows
that the majority of the cases are concerned with blindness or defective eyesight.
The next most important category is deafness and defects in hearing. There are
surprisingly few cases dealing with any other type of physical handicap.
111. The cases dealing with the physical characteristics of defendants are
confined almost exclusively to situations where the defendant has lost control of
a vehicle through temporary illness or unconsciousness. The WEsT's DIGEST has no
section dealing with the physical disabilities of defendants although there is a section
on the physical disabilities of plaintiffs (Negligence, keynote 86). CoRPus JuRIs
and similar collections give the subject of defendants' physical handicaps scant
consideration and cite no cases. The conclusion is inescapable that defendants
rarely if ever attempt to interject their physical disabilities in order to escape or.
mitigate the standard of the reasonably prudent man.
112. "The law takes no account of the infinite variety of temperament, intellect
and education which make the internal character of a given act so different in
different men." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
113. Note, for example, the following statement by GREEN: "There is nothing
in Vaughn v. Menlove (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 468 contradictory of this statement
.... In Vaughn v. Menlove the only question involved is as to the proper method
of leaving the issue to the jury. But the 'under the circumstances' of that case
allowed the jury to consider defendant's bona fides, his judgment, knowledge, etc.
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intelligence has relatively little to do with it, many of the factors which
ard associated with accident proneness are mental or emotional.114 Such
aspects of accident proneness will probably not be taken into account.
Other aspects of these studies, however, have been concerned with such
factors as reaction time and esthetokinetic coordination.11r The courts
may well treat such things as physical characteristics and allow the jury to
judge each individual according to his own, at least for the purpose of
tempering contributory negligence.
AGE, SANITY
Where a child is injured, American authority uniformly makes allow-
ance for his immaturity in judging his contributory negligence. 116 But
even here the test is not entirely individualized. The child is to be held
"to the exercise of the degree of care which ordinary children of his
age, intelligence, and experience, ordinarily exercise under similar circum-
stances. " 1±7 This means that he will be judged according to his own in-
telligence, experience and mental capacity so far as ability to perceive
the risk goes. But given perception of the risk, as determined by this test,
the child will be held to exercise the judgment of the standard child having
the other qualities (just mentioned) of the actor"1 8 Thus, the rashness
or impetuosity of the actor, if greater than average, will not relieve him
from a charge of negligence.1 19
This relaxation of the test for contributory negligence in the case of
children has not only been reflected in the language of instructions to the
jury. There are a good many crystallized rules that certain given combina-
as is done in other cases. The court very correctly perceived the impossibility of
stating a rule for each person. But that impossibility does not in any manner
avoid the fact that if defendant in such a case were a poor ignorant 'Brazes bottom'
negro farmer on the one hand or a prosperous agricultural chemist on the other,
such would be a most vital factor in the case although the judge would give the
same -formula in each case." JUDGE AND JuRY 167n (1930).
114. See James and Dickinson, op. cit. note 92, upra, 773 et seq.
115. Id., at 773.
116. Shulman, The Standard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE L. J. 618
(1927); Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants & Insane Persons, 23 MicH. L. REv.
9 (1924); Wilderman, The Question of an Infant's Ability to be Guilty of Con.
tributory Negligence, 10 IND. L. J. 427; Note 107 A.L.R. 100 (1937).
117. Ackerman v. Advance Petroleum Transport, 304 Mich. 96, 7 N.W. 2d
235, 239 (1942); Harvey v. Cole, 159 Kan. 239, 153 P. 2d 916, 918 (1944); Frazier
v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 F. Supp. 20, 24 (Idaho, 1939). See Shulman, The Stand-
ard of Care Required of Children, 37 YALE L. J. 618, 622 (1927).
118. Shulman, op. cit. supra, p. 625.
119. Ackerman v. Advance Petroleum Co., 304 Mich. 96, 7 N.W. 2d 235 (1942).
See Collins v. South Boston R.R., 142 Mass. 301, 315, 17 N.E. 856, 860 (1886).
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tions of conduct constitute negligence as a matter of law.12o There have been
many instances where children have been relieved from the operation of
a rule like this because of their age, and the question of their contributory
negligence sent to the jury.121 Nevertheless, in very clear cases children may
be found contributorily negligent as a matter of law.122
The question of how old a child may be and yet have his immaturity
considered does not give much trouble under the prevailing American doc-
trine which treats the matter as one of degree to be worked out in each
case where the plaintiff is technically a minor under its individual circum-
stances. While theoretically there is no age at which contributory negli-
gence is impossible,1 23 the universal view is to set an age below which a child
is held to be incapable of contributory negligence. The great majority
of states have established three as the age below which they will not allow
consideration of contributory negligence. 124 Above that age, the general
formula is kept flexible. Some states, however, have adopted rules of
thumb on the analogy of rules of the criminal law for determining the ages
at which children could be guilty of criminal intent.125 In these states,
120. See, e.g., Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident
Litigation, 3 LAW & Corr. PROB. 476 (1936); James, Accident Liability: Some
Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L. J. 365, 374 (1946); James, Chief Justice
Maltbie and the Law of Negligence, 24 CoNN. B. J. 61, 63 (1950).
121. See Note, 107 A.L.R. 4, 164 (1937) (and cases there collected). See also
Mertz, The Infant and Negligence Per Se in Pennsyvanria, 51 DicK. L. REV. 79
(1947). In Connecticut, by statute, the negligence of minors for statutory violation
is a question of fact for the jury. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7948 (Rev. 1949). But ef.
D'Ambrosio v. Philadelphia, 354 Penna. 403, 47 A. 2d 256 (1946) (12 year old
plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law for violating statute).
122. Ackerman v. Advance Petroleum Transport, 304 Mich. 96, 7 N.W. 2d 235(1942) (8 year old boy running into street without looking); Lobsenz v. Ruben-
stein, 258 App. Div. 164, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 848 (2d Dep't 1939), aff'd. 283 N. Y. 600,
28 N.E. 2d 22 (1940) (15 year old plaintiff slipping into known depression in tennis
court). See Note, 107 A.L.R. 4 (1937).
123. "The civil irresponsibility of a young child is not regarded as an invar-
iable concomitant of a certain age-except it be little if anything beyond swaddling
clothes-to be arbitrarily fixed upon such age alone, but is to be determined as
existing or not, from all the applicable circumstances, like any other question of
fact." per Graves, J., in Sorrentino v. McNeill, 122 S.W. 2d 723, 725 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
124. See for example Verni v. Johnson, 295 N. Y. 436, 68 N.E. 2d 431 (1946)(child three years two months old conclusively presumed to be incapable of contri-
butory negligence). See Note, 22 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 131 (1947). For a collection
of cases by states as to the age limits below which young children have been held
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law, see Note, 107 A.L.R. 4
(1937). See Wilderman. The Question of an Infant's Ability to be Guilty of Con-
tributory Negligence, 10 IND. L. J. 427 (1935).
125. Patrick v. Mitchell, 242 Ala. 414, 6 So. 2d 889 (1942); Moser v. East
St. Louis Interurban Water Co., 326 Ill. App. 542, 62 N.E. 2d 558 (1945); Dixon
v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347, 126 S.W. 2d 448 (1939); Nelson v. Arrowhead Freight
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children, under seven are conclusively presumed to be incapable of con-
tributory negligence; as to those between seven and fourteen there is a
rebuttable presumption that they have been careful (and their conduct is
judged by the subjective standard indicated above); children over fourteen
are treated like adults. Such a rule seems pretty mechanical and arbitrary.
Even if its counterpart has validity in the criminal law the existence of
any significant degree of correlation between the rates of development of a
child's sense of right and wrong on the one hand, and his perception of
danger and judgment of speeds and distances on the other, seems ques-
tionable.
The vast majority of cases relaxing the standard of conduct of children
have, as has often been noted, dealt with contributory negligence. Com-
mentators have been divided on the question whether there should be a
similar relaxation where a child is sought to be held liable for injuries he
has inflicted on another. The few appellate courts that have faced the
problem have also been divided,12 though there is reason to believe that
trial courts are generally applying an objective adult standard in motor
vehicle cases.' 27 I have elsewhere tried to examine the doctrinal and prac-
tical considerations involved in this problem.1 2  It was there noted that
by and large children themselves cannot and do not pay for the injuries
they cause; that such payment comes if at all from an employer or from
Lines, 99 Utah 129, 104 P. 2d 22$ (1940); Mert, The Infant and Negligence per se in
Pennsylvania, 51 DICK. L. REv. 79 (1947); Wilderman, The Question of an Infant's
Ability to be Guilty of Contributory Negligence, 10 I. L. J. 427 (1935). For a
collection of cases from the states adhering to the crimminal law rule, see Note, 107
A.L.R. 4 (1937).
126. In favor of a subjective standard-Briese v. Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 130
N.W. 893, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574, (1911) (playground injury); Charbonneau v.
MacRury, 84 N. H. 501, 153 At. 457, 73 A.L.R. 1266 (1931) (17 year old auto-
mobile driver); Harvey v. Cole, 159 Kan. 239, 153 P. 2d 916 (1944) (same instruc-
tion for 16 year old automobile driver as for 9 year old plaintiff as to standard of care);
Hoyt v. Rosenberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 500, 182 P. 2d 234 (1947) (12 year old boy
playing "Kick the can.") Bohlen, Liability in Torts of Infants and Insane Persons,
23 MicH. L. REv. 9 (1924). Against a subjective standard-Neal v. Gillett, 23
Conn. 437 (1855) (playground injury); Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 151, 173 N.W.
437 (1919) (dictum). Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. Rev. 40, 47 (1915).
However, even in those states inclined toward a subjective standard, the
courts have refused to apply the standard to determine the liability of an em-
ployer for the negligence of his minor servant-Hill Transp. Co. v. Everett, 145
F. 2d 746 (C.A.A. 1st 1944).
127. This has been reported to me as being the actual situation in Wisconsin.
Letter of Richard v. Campbell to author, dated Dec. 13, 1946. See also Transcript of
Record, p. 94, Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N.E. 2d 254 (1939) (charge
to jury).
128. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 549, 554 (1948); James and Dickenson, note 92, supra.
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insurance which the children themselves have not furnished; that they
constitute one of the most dangerous classes in society so far as causing
motor accidents goes. It was my conclusion that courts should and prob-
ably will (for the most part) hold the child defendant who is engaging
in dangerous adult activities (such as driving a car) to the standard of the
reasonably prudent adult. It is less important and more doubtful what
rule will emerge as to injuries caused by children at play.
Advanced age, like youth, has its shortcomings though they are dif-
ferent ones. Where these involve any impairment of faculties, that fact
ought to be considered in judging conduct.129
There is only a scant handfull of decided cases dealing with the matter
of insanity, though it was the subject of one of the very earliest dicta.' s '
Probably a subjective standard will be applied in determining the con-
tributory negligence of insane plaintiffs.131 While many courts require
that the plaintiff be devoid of intelligence to the extent that he is unable
to apprehend danger before allowing a relaxation of ihe stanfard,132 other
courts have allowed the jury to consider mental shortcomings of the merely
subnormal. 33 On the other hand, while the question is still an open one
129. At least so far as a plaintiff is concerned. Kitsap County Transportation
Co. v. Harvey, 15 F. 2d 166, 48 A.L.R. 1420 (C.A.A. 9th 1927); See Johnson v.
St. Paul Ry., 67 Minn, 260, 262, 69 N.W. 900, 36 L.R.A. 586 (1919). But cf.
Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 151, 173 N.W. 437 (1919) (reversing such a charge
for a 77 year old defendant automobile driver with defective sight and hearing,
while approving a requested instruction that a 7 year old plaintiff's conduct is to bejudged in the light of his age and mental capacity). Weaver v. Ward, Hobart
134, 80 Eng. Reprint 284 (1617). A collection of recent decisions and dicta appears
in RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 654 et seq. (1948 Supp.).
130. Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134, 80 Eng. Reprint 284 (1617). A collection of
recent decisions and dicta appears in RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 654 et seq. (1948
Supp.).
131. See Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Isane Persons, 23 Micir. L.
REV. 9 (1924); Horblower, Insanity and the Law of Negligence, 5 COL. L. Rnv.
278 (1905); Wilkinson, Mental Incompetency as a Defense to Tort Liability, 17
RocKY MOUNT. L. REv. 38 (1944); Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort,
21 COL. L. REv. 333 (1921). Upon the point, however, the American Law Insti-
tute "expresses no opinion." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 464, caveat.
132. Zajaczkowski v. State, 189 Misc. 299, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 261 (Ct. Cl. 1947)
mongoloid of mental age of 2/2 held incapable of contributory negligence as a
matter of law); Ruoback Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E. 2d 776(1942); Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. 72, 17 L.R.A. 407 (1892).
133. Seattle Electric Co. v. Hovden, 111 C.A.A. 191, 190 Fed. 7 (C.A.A. 9th
1911), aff'inng Hovden v. Seattle Electric Co., 180 Fed. 487 (C.C. 1910) (intel-
ligence below normal); Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry., 67 Minn. 260, 69 N.W. 900
(1887) (mental powers blunted with age). See Baltimore & P. RR. v. Cumberland,
176 U. S. 232, 238 (1900).
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in American law,13 4 the American Law Institute has finally thrown the
weight of its opinion behind the proposition that insane and subnormal
defendants be held to the standard of the reasonably prudent man, thus
repudiating the weight of earlier academic authority.25 The writer gladly
welcomes this move which is consistent with the double standard of conduct
for plaintiffs and defendants which we have already discussed21s
134. See Bohlen, op. cit. supra, n. 131; Hornblower, op. cit. n. .rUpra., 131
Wilkinson, op. cit. supra note 131; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 283 caveat. There have
been only two opinions dealing directly with the negligence of the insane, both
holding the defendants to the standard of the reasonably prudent man. One is
obscure-Williams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442, 38 N.E. 449, 26 L.R.A. 154 (1894),
qual'd, 157 N. Y. .41, 52 N.E. 589, 43 L.R.A. 253 (1899); the other, Sforza v.
Green Bus Lines, Inc., 150 Misc. k80 N. Y. Supp. 446 (Mum. Ct. N. Y. 1934),
is distinguishable both for its reliance on the above opinion, and on the ground that
the employer was invoking the servant's insanity to avoid liability. Cf. Hill Transp.
Co. v. Everett 145 F. 2d 746 (C.C.A. 1st 1944) (relaxed standard not applied in
favor of infanes employer, under. New Hampshire law). Fortunately, however,
these possible grounds of distinction did not prevent the American Law Institute
from relying on this case in making the changes described in the text.
135. Bohlen, op cit. supra, n. 131; Hornblower, op. cit. supra, n 131; Wilkin-
son, op. cit. supra n. 131; Cook, op. cit. supra n. 131. The change made by the
Institute appears in AzmmeAN LAW INsTITUTE, RESTATEMENT oF THnE LAW pp. 654
et seq. (1948 Supp.).
136. See above p. 2.
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